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9 Jan. 1951

NIE 10

COMMENTS ON NIE-10

(Draft of 8 Jan. 1951)

1. Point 4c, page 5. Suggest the following sentence be added: "However, the USSR on the other hand might welcome continuation of the Formosa impasse, perhaps as a means of concentrating Chinese attention on anti-Western themes, diverting it from Soviet aggrandizement at the expense of China."
2. Point 6b, page 7. I doubt that these measures would be as successful as is indicated.
3. Point 8, page 8. Suggest the sentence beginning "Insofar as Communist China..." be eliminated. It is extraneous at this point, and I seriously question whether in real terms the alliance has been a "good bargain" for China.
4. Point 10, page 9. Suggest the first sentence be changed to read: "Chinese Communist ties with the USSR would undoubtedly be strengthened, at least temporarily, if the US imposed....etc." While Chinese dependence on the USSR would increase, Soviet failure, due to inability or unwillingness, to meet China's requirements might strain the alliance.
5. Point 11, page 9. Suggest the reference to the Kwantung naval base be omitted. I doubt that the USSR even<sup>R</sup> had any serious intention of evacuating it, and

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also, under foreseeable circumstances, ~~XX~~ I doubt that the Chinese Communists would desire Soviet evacuation of the base.

6. Point 11, page 9. Suggest the last sentence be changed to read: "There is no evidence that the USSR has in fact overimposed upon the Chinese desire to cooperate with the USSR, and there is no reason to believe that, following the lesson of Yugoslavia to the Kremlin, the USSR will do so." As the sentence now reads, it appears that Soviet interest in China is limited to the engagement of US resources in the Far East and the security of Soviet Asia.

7. Point 13, page 10. Suggest the last phrase of the last sentence be changed to read"....would the Chinese Communists have reason to believe that they could successfully break their alliance with the USSR." The factors noted in the sentence as it now reads are not the only ones which would give the Chinese reason to break their alliance. These conditions, however, are probably the only ones under which a break could be accomplished without disastrous results to the Chinese Communist regime.

8. Point 14, page 10. Suggest this paragraph be changed to read: "If circumstances should develop during the next few years under which the Chinese Communists could reason that it would be profitable to break the alliance, they may have the

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capability of doing so. This capability would depend largely upon the continued control of the Army by the Chinese Communist leadership. The majority of some 20,000 Soviet advisors in China are with the Army, however, and, although there is no definite evidence of the extent of their control or influence, it seems reasonable to assume that the reliability of at least certain units would be questionable. The leadership of the party itself has also been subject to close Soviet attention and, should dominant Stalinist influence persist, a Sino-Soviet division would, of course, be out of the question." As it now stands, the paragraph overlooks the importance of Soviet influence in the Army, and, as regards the party, wide penetration is not essential, the leadership and its immediate organs are the prime target. This does not present an insuperable problem.

9. Point 15, page 11. Suggest that the last sentence be changed to read: "It is only in the long range power struggle between the USSR and the West that there is a possibility that China's position will not remain fixed; any ~~change~~ change would arise out of the developing policies, objectives strengths, and dispositions of the resources of the US and the USSR. Current trends in these factors on the Soviet side, furthermore, would have to change drastically before any break could be anticipated."

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